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In the greater course of the twentieth cen-
tury, nation and empire have been juxta-
posed. The nation is privileged in the role 
of the ‘good’, as the product and vehicle of 
modernity, as the mark of progress asso-
ciated with the ideals of liberty, democracy 
and self-determination; while the empire is 
condemned in the role of the ‘bad’, inexora-
bly associated with expansionism, conquest, 
imperialism, arbitrariness and tyranny. 
However, in today’s age of globalisation 
and European unification, where the future 
of the nation-state appears uncertain, this 
contrast along value lines appears less con-
vincing, if not simplistic. Indeed, in view of 
the recent extended violence carried out by 
nation states in the name of unity and terri-
torial integrity and the corresponding rise of 
ethnic nationalisms reacting with their own 
wanton violence, the concept of empire has 
appeared in a more favourable light. It is in-
creasingly associated with the idea of loose 
and porous frontiers; the imperial mentality 
is associated with the concept of tolerance 
and with the elegant and pragmatic manage-
ment of ethnic and national heterogeneity in 
its jurisdiction. Thus, the concept of empire 
is studied nowadays not only as the histori-
cal precursor of recent trends but also as a 
theoretical model for conceptualising a new 
possible future alternative.1
This discussion has increasingly come to the 
fore in present-day multi-ethnic Russia, in its 
attempt to redefine its identity and come to 
terms with its past and its long experience 
of imperial rule. Thus in public and scientific 
discourse, there is an ongoing debate (with 
little sign of consensus emerging) whether 
it is possible or advisable to erase – as has 
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largely been the case until recently – a valuable historical experience in which the Russians were 
the participants as well as the creators. There is a quest for a navigation point that could provide 
answers on how to cope with the acute present-day dilemmas and problems in the Russian 
Federation, both internally, particularly in regard to the Chechen minefield, as well as externally 
with regard to the country’s relations with the various states of the ‘near abroad’, those states 
which formed the Soviet Union along with Russia until 1991.2 
Given the renewed interest in the trappings of empire of late, the study of the Russian Empire, 
always a fascinating subject in its own right, has attracted greater attention. 
In the Russian case the period from the Great Reforms of the eighteen sixties until the Revolu-
tion of 1905 is central to the discussion of the interplay between empire and nation. 1905 was a 
milestone, as following the first Russian Revolution, a constitution was introduced which per-
mitted political parties and finally allowed the masses to enter the realm of politics.3 The Great 
Reforms that commenced in the eighteen sixties contributed to rapid economic development 
and to the social and structural differentiation of the Russian scene. All this gave rise to a new 
political reality favourable to the emergence of a new social and political consciousness, often 
described as obshchestvennost’,4 a multi-hued concept, which at its very core implies at least 
two things: the emergence of a civic society and the shaping of a civic consciousness, clearly 
implying that Russian nationals are in fact citizens entitled to claim the right of participation in 
society.5 This was when the Russian state and society come face to face with a political problem 
of a new order: nationalism (obviously non-state nationalism or ethnonationalism in current 
parlance) as amply demonstrated in the Polish Revolt of 1863.
This article will proceed along two tracks. Firstly, it will dwell on some of the recent findings of 
the new, more sophisticated approaches on Tsarist Russia that have surfaced in since 1990 and 
which provide greater insight into the interplay between empire and nation.6 Secondly, it will 
highlight several issues from the debates on coming to terms with the ‘national question’ in the 
imperial Tsarist context and beyond, which were carried out between distinguished members 
of the Russian intelligentsia in the second part of the nineteenth century.
The problematic nature of empire has contributed in no small measure in making it more than 
obvious, at least among Russia specialists, that the Russian state was hardly a national state of the 
Russian nation.7 The intellectual and political elites of the Russian state varied ethnically, linguisti-
cally and religiously; even in the higher echelons, there were not only Orthodox Russians, but also, 
for example, Catholic Poles, Protestant Baltic Germans, Muslim Tatars from the Volga region and 
the Urals. The Romanov Dynasty, itself partly Russian and partly European (as a result of intermar-
riage), strove to retain its predominance on the basis of the social divisions of the population, that 
is on social-class criteria rather than on ethnic, religious, linguistic or other ascriptive affinities. 
The concept of Russia as a state identifying itself with the Great Russians emerged gradually in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. This new notion of statehood is associated to a considerable 
extent with the Russian historians of the time who began to narrate the history of the Russian state 
within a national context.8 This new reading of history and ‘reality’ chose to ignore the fact that Rus-
sia had not been a nation-state or a state associated with one dominant nation; it was a country 
that for most of its history had been a mosaic of ethnic groups, cultures, languages, religions and 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:09:04 |
96
Empire and Nation HISTOREIN
V
O
L
U
M
E
 5 (2005)
97
dogmas. Russian nationalism was one among many other ideologies cum group identities, vying 
for influence in the wide spectrum of the Empire. As argued by Andreas Kappeler, at the end of the 
nineteenth century Russia’s priorities were above all securing and not jeopardising the Empire’s 
power and status as a Great Power, its security, internally as well as externally, the loyalty of its 
citizens and the avoidance of conflict-prone policies regarding ethnicity and cultural diversity.9 
In the attempt to meet these vital interests and goals, the last three Romanov Tsars opted for a policy 
of unification and strove to fuse the empire, culturally and administratively and, to the greatest degree 
possible, to eradicate local peculiarities. This policy of ‘Russification’, a very emotionally charged 
and value-laden term, is stereotypically associated with the attempts of the Romanovs to alter the 
ethnic and cultural diversity of the country in the name of Russian homogeneity.10 
Since the late nineteen eighties, the ‘new imperial Russian history’ refers to the policies of Rus-
sification and not to a consistent grand strategy of Russification. This turn was influenced, in 
particular, by Edward Thaden’s pace-setting work on Russification, in which he makes a very 
useful distinction between what he calls administrative and cultural Russification.11 If state poli-
cies were placed on a spectrum ranging from a model of a nationally homogenised Russian 
state at one end to a culturally diverse state at the other, actual state policies would be balanced 
somewhere in the middle, as the more extreme forms of cultural assimilation were less com-
mon. The predominant view was that some differences had to be expunged while others could 
persist.12 The policies of Russification differed from one region or case to another. There was 
an array of forms of unification used depending on the region or case concerned, as depicted by 
the following terms: Christianisation, assimilation, rapprochement, integration, acculturation, 
civilising mission and straight-forward Russification. In some instances, the elimination of dif-
ferences was fostered on a voluntary basis (individually or collectively); in many, it was induced 
or even forced; in others, it was more of a natural process of integration. Obviously, some forms 
of difference were more palatable than others. Mostly, pragmatism was the overriding criterion 
and in this context, the Polish case is a good example. The Russian authorities were well aware 
that they could not realistically hope to assimilate or Russify a culturally equivalent if not more 
potent (owing to their longer history) people than themselves.13 
A variety of other factors played a considerable role in the implementation as well as the effec-
tiveness of these policies, such as the economic, administrative and other capabilities of the Rus-
sian state at any give moment (as a whole and in the region in question). In addition, the actual 
abilities and attitudes of state officials, those charged with the task of adopting the policies and 
their actual zeal – which was often too much or too little – in carrying out their instructions, were 
crucial, as were regional or country-wide changes in attitudes or the streamlining of policies 
based on experience. Nowadays scholars, be they Russian or Western, who have studied this 
question from the prism of Russian bureaucrats, take the view that the policy of Russification of 
the last three Romanov Tsars was, for the most part, not as uniform, consistent, systematic or 
unflinching as it was believed to be only a few decades ago.14 
It is also worth stressing that the policy of Russification differed from modern-day nationalism 
for its avowed aim was firstly the unity of a non-national imperial state and secondly the bol-
stering of Russian culture.15 Of course, as has been correctly pointed out, Alexander III tended to 
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utilize, in his various pronouncements and other official presentations, the symbols and other 
paraphernalia associated with the language of nationalism, as understood in the Russian con-
text.16 Yet, most of the time he also made it a point to positively refer to the multi-ethnic character 
of Russia as a whole. The national imperative, that is to say the creation of a state that would 
embody the Russian nation alone, was alien to the conservative Romanovs, who could afford 
to wield several other important symbols of unity that were less restrictive, thereby providing 
ample room for non-Russians in what was intended as a wider imperial embrace.17 
The Russification policies may also be viewed from another perspective. They can be placed 
under the framework of the anti-reform policy undertaken by Alexander III, with his emphasis 
on absolutism, at a time when the country’s transformation brought to the fore new social and 
economic forces that called for more flexible forms of governance. 
Patriotism as distinct from nationalism remained the main vehicle of the state elites in their at-
tempt to foment loyalty to the state. It was the view that everyone in the Empire, irrespective of 
ethnicity, could be a devoted Russian subject, faithful to the sovereign, who could serve his coun-
try loyally to the best of his abilities. State patriotism retained its salience, witnessed by the fact 
that, until the early twentieth century, the higher echelons of imperial society retained a marked 
degree of political cohesion irrespective of their ethnic origin.18 From the mid-nineteenth century, 
the imperial administrators began to regard the concept of citizenship (grazhdanstvennost’) as 
a more subtle and effective avenue in the attempt to integrate the non-Russian peoples of the 
Empire. Citizenship could also prove salutary when it came to sensitive borderland regions. This 
Russian rendition of citizenship had at least three dimensions: building a common collective 
identity; constructing a public sphere; and wishing to foster an image of the loyal imperial citizen, 
who was content even though popular sovereignty had not been granted (and his citizenship was 
more or less coterminous with the status of a mere imperial subject).19 
The various new perspectives of Russian history also shed light on the reverse side of the coin, par-
ticularly what it meant for someone to be a Russian subject/citizen in the sense of identifying with the 
state. What did Russianness imply for non-ethnic Russian subjects/citizens? To what degree did 
they desire, especially at the elite level, to partake of Russian culture20 and to participate actively 
in the affairs of the Empire?21 Setting aside the bipolarities of empire/nation and Russian/non-
Russian, which implies polarization, confrontation and subjugation, would it be too far-fetched to 
envisage faith and loyalty  inter-ethnic cooperation, cross-fertilization or a modicum of reconcilia-
tion across ethnic communities? If this is plausible and was extensive in scope, was implosion 
and disintegration on ethnic grounds inevitable in Russia?22 
Since 1990, the new historical approaches on the history of the Russian Empire have called into ques-
tion the traditional black and white tapestry of the Russian Empire as ‘the dungeon of peoples’. These 
approaches highlight the multiplicity and hybrid quality of group identity and ethnicity.23 Such stand-
points clearly discard the pure national narratives and the various exclusive national discourses 
that believe collective identities were fully homogenized and patently national even well before the 
modern age. The new national or ‘official’ histories that blossomed on the ruins of the former Soviet 
Union have great difficulty in grasping and analysing supra-national identities and the concept of 
imperial citizenship that evolved in the course of common life in a multiethnic Empire. 
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It is now important to progress to the second theme, namely how Russian intellectuals at the 
time approached the question of the relation between nation and empire or, in other words, the 
discussions on the national question and how best to cope with this potentially explosive phe-
nomenon within the Russian imperial context. As above, the period from the end of the Crimean 
War until 1905 will be examined. 
Why put the emphasis on intellectual discourse? The obvious reason is that Russian intellectuals, 
individually or collectively, were very articulate and visible in their attempts to understand and 
envisage the real world and address the complicated question of ethnic and cultural diversity in 
their country. The intellectuals, through word and deed, had the ability to shape the cognitive, ethical 
and even the political ‘maps’ of their contemporaries. Their journals – notably the ‘thick’ variety 
– were one of the main avenues of dialogue and debate about the pressing political problems of 
the Empire and their authors and editors produced potent networks geared to communicating 
and promoting their views. They operated from the premise that it was not up to the state and its 
apparatus to decide public matters. The people of the empire, but most of all themselves, were 
entitled to influence political decision-making for the common good and for Russia.24
Spearheaded by intellectuals or former state functionaries, by the nineteenth century in particu-
lar public debate had become increasingly common and important in the empire. The networks 
of intellectuals and other activists along with the journals formed what the obshchestvennoe 
mnenie (public opinion), which in the Russian context of the nineteenth century was regarded as 
the views, perceptions and beliefs fostered by activists and reformers; men who above all were 
– and were seen to be – independent in their judgement and moral stance. Not surprisingly, the 
comportment of state and its whole approach mostly dismayed these active individuals. As a 
result, they tended to be critical or disdainful of the imperial state and of its workings. Yet this 
was not always the case and there were times when revered thinkers took a more conciliatory 
line, even identifying with the state on a particular issue, though this was the exception in the 
turbulent Russia of the second part of the nineteenth century.
In the second part of nineteenth century, the national discourse certainly was not the only discus-
sion engaged in by intellectuals; nor was it necessarily mainstream. It was in competition with 
other distinct discourses, namely the class approach and the dynastic approach, for the heart 
and minds of people and state. 
For those active in the national debate, be they conservative, liberal or radical, the common 
thread was the acceptance and belief in the existence of nations as the main collectivities across 
the globe, if not in the past then at least in the present and certainly in the future. For them the 
nation was a basic analytical category. Furthermore, most of the intellectuals who accepted this 
image of the world regarded national self-determination as the inalienable right of all nations, 
particularly if these nations existed in other empires and other multi-ethnic societies. However, 
national self-determination or the principle of nationality, as it was known in the nineteenth cen-
tury, did not necessarily imply secession but could include forms of self-assertion and national 
participation and expression via other means, such as through various forms of autonomy or 
within a federal framework.25 There was considerable discussion on the notion of patriotism, in 
the sense that one could be a Russian patriot devoted to the state without being in fact ethnically 
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Russian. The nationalist discourse in Russia had many facets, ranging from ultra-conservatism 
to liberal or radical views. In order to illustrate, however impressionistically, what was going on 
at the time among intellectual circles, the characteristic views of three influential figures, Ivan A. 
Aksakov, Aleksandr A. Kireev and Vladimir S. Solov’ev, will be referred to here. 
In right-wing nationalist discourse, the Russian state was “one and indivisible” but this was not 
enough: it was imperative that the country transform itself into a fully-fledged national state of 
ethnic Russians.  In his writings, Aksakov, the distinguished Slavophile and right-wing conserva-
tive, expressed his opposition to the dynasty and promoted his own rendition of patriotism by 
identifying it with nationalism. He regarded the relationship between the Russian state and the 
Russian nation as sacred and went so far as not to distinguish between rossiskij (pertaining to the 
Russian state) and russkij (being ethnically Russian). He was particularly harsh with the highest 
state elites for distinguishing between nationalism and patriotism (he also despised them on ac-
count of their varied ethnic origins), arguing that it was inconceivable to fight and sacrifice oneself 
for one’s state, its territorial integrity or prestige. In his opinion, only suffering and fighting for 
the nation was conceivable. The concept of patriotism as advocated by the state elite and by a 
portion of the intelligentsia was void and lopsided and could not tap the genuine Russian spirit, 
he felt, so vibrant in the Russian countryside.26
Not all conservatives or Slavophile thinkers, however, agreed with this viewpoint. A case in point 
was General Kireev, adjutant of the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich, a well-known Russian 
Slavophile. His views combined nationalism with imperial rule. He was much closer to the original 
triadic dictum of “autocracy, Orthodoxy, nationality”, famously set forth by Count Sergey S. Uvarov 
in 1834. A deeply religious person who sought salvation in Orthodoxy, Kireev was of the view that 
Orthodoxy was the vital element of Russian state identity. Absolutism had to bow to Orthodoxy and 
temper its power by introducing the institution of the zemsto conferences, a system of local ad-
ministration. This, Kireev believed, was the convincing answer to what he regarded as the chaotic 
situation reigning in Western parliamentary systems. For him, the Russian nation was sacred; it 
was the state of Holy Russia; the Russians were the only true Orthodox nation. Hence, there could 
be no question on who was to hold sway in the Russian state. However, there was room for non-
Orthodox (“infidel”) Russian citizens to participate in this wider Russian otechestvo (fatherland) 
not out of fear but on the basis of a sense of common duty to this fatherland, as was the case for 
non-Catholic citizens in France or Catholics in Prussia. The general was a fervent champion of 
the rights of all Slavic peoples. Of course, this line placed him in a difficult position vis-à-vis the 
Polish question. His way out was to condemn the persecution of “aliens”,27 including Catholics, and 
to accept the right of the Poles to self-determination only on the proviso that they would accept 
Slavophile theories. However, for safe measure he was quick to remark that the true desire of the 
Poles was not independence as such, but no less than to dominate the Russians, on the basis of 
historical rights, something that was of course totally unacceptable.28 
As for the liberal strand, its hallmark in relation to the state tended to be the road of conciliation 
and negotiation. Its goal was not the Great Russian chauvinism of the conservatives nor the 
violent, revolutionary overthrow of the existing ancien régime as demanded by the radicals, but 
rather the path of peaceful evolutionary transformation into a thoroughly modern and democratic 
state. As regards nationalism and ethnicity, the public presence and political stance of many 
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liberals was a moral calling for tolerance towards ethnic diversity. It is worth stressing that the 
concept of tolerance is a constant feature of Russian discourse regarding the characteristics of 
Russian identity. In the wording of the liberals and some conservative Slavophiles, tolerance was 
seen as a Russian virtue, the stuff that could establish a modus vivendi between the Russians 
and the other peoples within the Empire. They tried to combine tolerance with the principle of 
nationality in its benign manifestations. Tolerance was inexorably associated with the notion of 
civilisation. Hence, the notion of civilisation and progress, as utilised by Imperial Russia and other 
colonial powers, was fake, a mere cloak for their expansionism and conquests.29
In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, criticism towards the phenomenon of nationalism 
gained momentum, particularly in the liberal and radical milieux. Reference was made to the 
degeneration of nationalism, which had come to be associated with a lack of tolerance and free-
dom, domination, brutality and imperialism. The intellectuals of these two traditions, motivated 
by the high ideal of human solidarity, increasingly came to regard the nation-state as passé and 
as an obstacle to human progress. Intolerance, the hallmark of nationalism, was regarded the 
antithesis of humane and civilised behaviour. This degradation from the role of a locomotive of 
to an impediment to historical progress was explained by the fact that nations – or a particular 
nation – came to be associated with states or a particular state.30
A case in point among the liberal thinkers of this period was the distinguished philosopher and 
publicist, Vladimir S. Solov’ev, who was very influential and active in the two last decades of the 
nineteenth century.31 Solov’ev examined the current problems of Russian society from the prism 
of Eurocentric liberalism and the ethics emanating from Christian humanism, a subject on which 
he himself has made an outstanding contribution from the perspective of Orthodox theology and 
ethics. Solov’ev’s main contribution as a publicist was to articulate the moral-ethical dimension 
of liberalism in the name of the ‘common good’, to put to task the rising conservatism of Alexander 
III and to counter the policies of Russification. His penetrating and often harsh critique of nation-
alist excesses, particularly carried out by and in the name of Russians, but also on the part of 
‘subject nations’ who found themselves in a privileged position towards other weaker nations, 
gained him a wide audience as well as many staunch enemies.32
Solov’ev distinguishes between “narodnost” (nation or nationality) and the notion of nationalism. He 
believed that the formation of nations was a vital course in the evolution of humanity, as it involved 
smaller units fusing into larger ones, a process he envisaged would continue until the goal of world 
historical evolution was achieved, which he understood would represent the “the return to unity for 
all”. Accordingly, nations were vehicles of historical progress, but crucially not goals or ideal states 
in themselves. Nations were simply the different organs in the body of humanity and although pro-
gressive at a certain stage in world evolution, they were not innately progressive. Nations became 
progressive or retrogressive depending on their stance vis-à-vis humanity. In Solov’ev’s estimation, 
it was crucial to examine whether a nation considered itself as distinct from the wider whole and dis-
sociated itself from the rest of the world. If so, the nation in question had lapsed into regression.33 
Solov’ev recognised and defended the idea of national self-determination as the right of every 
nation. He was of the firm belief that every nation had the right to live independently from other 
nations and develop its national talents freely. For Solov’ev, the national idea was a call for political 
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participation and equality, for which the weaker nations struggled and sought freedom. At the same 
time, however, no state had a carte blanche in its emancipating role. The nation – any nation – could 
lapse into “nationalism or national egoism” to the extent that it sought to establish itself at the ex-
pense of another people. Such comportment was an affront to the national idea; it was dangerous 
to the world as a whole and to the nation in question and could lead its people to oblivion.34
In Solov’ev’s estimation, the concept of nationalism was not positive nor even neutral from an 
evaluative viewpoint. Nationalism, according to him, was by definition against human progress 
and could have no moral standing under any circumstances. It was a form of chauvinism and 
an expression of the worst in the nation concerned, not least in a culturally pluralist setting. 
As such, nationalism needed to be distinguished from patriotism, which is the genuine love 
for one’s country (otechestvo). Patriotism for him was a form of self-negation of nationalism, 
though not of the nation or the people, for humanity was divided, for better or for worse, into 
separate nations and there was no immediate reason to overcome this division. Solov’ev was 
of the belief that all nations could produce positive feelings towards other nations. It was within 
this framework that Solov’ev placed the Russian nation and the Russian national question. The 
Russians after all were not under foreign rule. In their case, it was not a question of survival 
and liberation but one of decent coexistence with other nations. For the Russians (and Russia) it 
was essential to expunge every facet of nationalism and national egoism in midst. For Solov’ev, 
state and nation were distinct entities. The state and state politics needed to be above the nation; 
its main goal was guaranteeing security for all its citizens and welfare, in this way rendering its 
subjects true citizens, imbued with the idea of grazhdanstvennost’ (citizenship).35
In the late nineteenth century, liberalism and radicalism tried to combine national tolerance 
with the maintenance and territorial integrity of the Russian state by distinguishing between 
nation and state, as seen in Solov’ev’s case. Liberal and radical thinkers approached national 
self-determination from the angle of statehood, which in the Russian case was associated with 
considerable prestige and the influence of being one of the Great Powers. According to this line 
of reasoning, a nation could be free, content and a master of its own destiny without necessarily 
gaining the trappings of statehood as a nation-state. With the removal of the state and territo-
rial elements from the concept of nation, the emphasis was put on the cultural sphere, which 
alone could provide collective identity and sense of worth within a wider state. Increasingly the 
idea came to prevail that large multicultural countries should not disintegrate along national 
grounds. Indeed any such disintegration leading to the creation of smaller, (nation) states was 
bound to create more problems than solutions. In order for Russia to survive, it had to become 
the homeland (patrie) of all of its constituent ethnicities. 
The liberals saw the national question as one important aspect of the wider social question in 
the Empire and in this context they sought the granting and reinforcement of civil liberties and 
the equality in law and practice of all the members of ethnic groups and minorities. Two threads 
run through liberal thinking in Russia at the time in its internal debates as well as vis-à-vis 
the Empire: the meaning and content of patriotism and the meaning and content of citizenship 
(grazhdanstvennost’). It is these two concepts that could invigorate the nationalities in Russia 
without at the same time giving rise to centrifugal tendencies, as has been the case until now 
with the policies of Russification and the nationalist reaction to them.36 
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This paper has tried to approach the setting of state policies on ethnicity and the views of in-
tellectuals in the latter nineteenth century not from the point of the ultimate and inescapable 
conflict between Empire and Nation – with the nation-state as the obvious winner – but rather 
from the point of possible reconciliation, as advocated by the liberals in particular. According to 
this alternative viewpoint, the impending twentieth century could become the century that would 
abolish national confrontation; the century that would dissolve the boundaries of nations and 
render state boundaries irrelevant.37 Of course we know, with bitter hindsight, that the twentieth 
century did not meet the expectations of Russian liberals. Nevertheless, as we enter the new 
world of the twenty-first century, their thoughts are of considerable value.
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